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ARTICLES
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE SCOPE OF
ARTICLE III-A VIEW FROM THE FEDERALIST
Michael G. Collins *
I. INTRODUCTION
In The Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton provided the
Ratification era's best-known defense of Article III's provisions for
judicial independence and for tenure during good behavior to se-
cure it.' His main argument, grounded in separation of powers
concerns, asserted that independence in office was needed for the
judiciary to be a reliable check on the legislature by holding un-
constitutional laws to be void in cases that come before them.2 By
contrast, a judiciary with less protection might show "improper
complaisance" with the political branches that appointed them
and/or that had an easy power of removal.3 Hamilton noted that
while judicial independence might not always be necessary for ju-
dicial review, it would otherwise take "an uncommon portion of
* Visiting Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School; Robert A.
Ainsworth Professor of Courts and the Federal System, Tulane University Law School.
B.A., 1972, Pomona College; M.A., 1975, Stanford University; J.D., 1978, Harvard Law
School. I would like to thank Ann Woolhandler and Jonathan Nash for their comments on
an earlier draft of this essay.
1. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). I do
not address whether Hamilton's underlying assumptions about legislative dependence of
the judiciary were accurate, much less whether the Constitution's provisions for life tenure
(or the limits on it) achieved their supposed aim. See Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention
to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the First Amendment, and Judges as
Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POLy REV. 301, 306 & n.28 (2003) (discussing skeptical modern
commentary regarding the insulation of the judiciary from the political process).
2. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 522-23 (Alexander Hamilton).
3. Id. at 529.
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fortitude" to resist legislative encroachments.4 Drawing from his-
tory, Hamilton suggested that "in republics," independent judici-
aries had historically formed an "excellent barrier [against] the
encroachments and oppressions of the representative body";5 by
checking such usurpations, the judiciary could thereby serve "as
the bulwark[] of a limited constitution" and a defender of lib-
erty.7
Nevertheless, judicial independence from the political branches
had its potential downside as well. The federal judiciary could it-
self engage in acts of constitutional usurpation that might be dif-
ficult to remedy.' Hamilton, however, supposed that other struc-
tural limitations on the judicial branch made that possibility less
of a threat than political branch encroachments.' And it was not
as if the political branches lacked all means of ensuring account-
ability,1" including impeachment if federal judges engaged in "a
series of deliberate usurpations on the authority of the legisla-
ture."1 In addition, by discarding schemes in which the life-
4. Id. at 528.
5. Id. at 522.
6. Id. at 526.
7. Id. at 523-24. Hamilton believed liberty was in danger when the judicial branch
was not distinct from the political branches. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 335-
37 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (criticizing intermingling of legislative and
judicial functions at the state level).
8. Anti-Federalists were especially concerned about expansive equitable construc-
tions of the scope of federal judicial power. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words:
Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1042 (2001) (describing Anti-Federalist fears that state courts would
be eclipsed by such constructions, and along with them, the trial by jury in civil cases).
9. Hamilton famously stated that the judiciary lacked control over "the sword or the
purse," and exercised "neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment." THE FEDERALIST NO.
78, supra note 1, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton). The judiciary therefore had to depend on
the aid of the executive to see its judgments enforced. See id. Anti-Federalist essayists
were less sanguine. See, e.g., Essays of Brutus No. XV (Mar. 20, 1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 437, 438 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (referring to federal judges as
"independent of... every power under heaven").
10. For a discussion of external controls, ranging from the budgetary, to jurisdictional
regulation, to impeachment, see John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent
Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962,
976-94 (2002); see also Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability,
and the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 IND.
L.J. 153, 157 (2003) (explaining why "some incursions on judicial autonomy are deemed
acceptable and others are not").
11. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 545-46 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (noting that occasional "misconstructions" presented no similar problem); see also
THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 7, at 334 (James Madison) (indicating that because
the federal judicial power was well-delineated "projects of usurpation [by the judiciary]
would immediately betray and defeat themselves").
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tenured judiciary would have a role in lawmaking, the Constitu-
tion ensured that judges would not be predisposed toward the va-
lidity of laws that they may have played a part in approving,'
2
while simultaneously ensuring that the legislature would be free
from judicial interference at the lawmaking stage.13
Although focused on separation of powers, the judicial inde-
pendence argument in The Federalist No. 78 contains an impor-
tant, if less explicit and less discussed, federalism dimension as
well. The same separation of powers problem that Hamilton saw
Article III as avoiding at the federal level-the dependence of the
judiciary on the political branches-was present at the state
level, where certain state judiciaries were beholden to legisla-
tures for their retention and where the political branches some-
times had a role in judicial decisionmaking."4 While the Constitu-
tion is not directly concerned with questions of separation of
powers at the state level,'5 for Hamilton it was the absence of pro-
tections for judicial independence in some of the states that
played a major role in shaping the extent of federal judicial
power. 6 That role was reflected not only in Article III's extension
of judicial power over cases implicating federal law and the Con-
stitution, but in its party-based grants as well.' 7 At the same
time, there were other concerns less related to issues of state ju-
dicial independence that also played an important part in Hamil-
ton's defense of Article III's scope.
My purpose in this essay is to assess the extent to which The
Federalist relies on arguments about judicial independence to
12. See THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 11, at 544 (Alexander Hamilton)
(doubting that "men who had infringed the constitution, in the character of legislators,
would be disposed to repair the breach, in the character ofjudges").
13. Although he recognized the risk of judicial usurpations, Hamilton supposed that
the greater danger was that the judiciary, on account of its "natural feebleness," would be
"overpowered, awed or influenced" by the political branches. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78,
supra note 1, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton).
14. See infra note 27 (describing state judicial arrangements in 1787).
15. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 386-87 (1821) (stating that
"[tihe constitution of the United States furnishes no security against the universal adop-
tion of this principle [of judicial dependence on legislative will]"); see also Akhil Reed
Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdic-
tion, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 226 n.81 (1985) (connecting the lack of federal constitutional
standards for state courts with the structure and scope of Article III).
16. See discussion infra Part II.
17. See discussion infra Parts III.B., V.
20041
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help justify the extent of federal judicial power-particularly as it
related to various party-based grants of jurisdiction. Most schol-
arship on judicial independence focuses on the role it plays in ju-
dicial review of the constitutionality of federal action, as well as
the constitutionality of state action and its conformity to federal
law. Although judicial independence has played a part in modern
discussions of party-based grants such as diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction, its linkage to such grants is less clear. Hamilton
linked the two by proceeding from the relatively uncontroversial
argument in favor of judicial tenure in office, as a way to mini-
mize dependence on the appointing power," to the more contro-
versial argument for the scope of federal judicial power in these
areas.19 For Hamilton, an important function of the federal courts
was to make up for the separation of powers provisions that were
lacking in some of the states' judiciaries, at least for certain cate-
gories of cases in which the risk of appointing-power deference
was thought to present a national concern.2"
II. STATE COURTS AS MODELS FOR FEDERAL COURTS
The argument for judicial independence in The Federalist No.
78 is phrased in general terms, but is ostensibly directed to the
role of the federal courts vis-&-vis the political branches of the
federal government. Although this aspect of The Federalist No. 78
has been the one most emphasized by scholars, individual state
governmental arrangements were very much a part of that argu-
ment.21 Hamilton borrowed a number of positive examples from
the state courts to argue for judicial independence at the federal
level and to minimize the novelty of Article III's provisions for
good behavior. For example, Hamilton suggested that Article III
was designed to be "conformable to the most approved of the state
constitutions" which already had provisions regarding tenure
18. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 529-30 (Alexander Hamilton).
19. For arguments about the scope of judicial power, see Essays by a Farmer VI (Apr.
1, 1788), in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 53-54; Essays of Brutus
XIV (Mar. 6, 1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 436; Letters
from The Federal Farmer XVIII (Jan. 25, 1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 9, at 343-44.
20. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 11, at 547 (Alexander Hamilton).
21. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L.
REV. 315, 319 (1999) (noting that "[e]xperience under state arrangements had a profound
effect on" the Constitution's Framers and Ratifiers).
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during good behavior.22 And he called the development of the good
behavior standard "one of the most valuable of the modern im-
provements in the practice of government."23 In addition, Hamil-
ton drew on the practice of certain state judiciaries to support his
argument that an independent judiciary best secured the impar-
tial administration of laws, quite apart from its role in securing
fearless assessment of their constitutionality.24 He concluded by
noting that "there can be no room to doubt that the convention
acted wisely in copying from the models of those constitutions
which have established good behaviour as the tenure of their ju-
dicial offices."25
Flattery was a part of Hamilton's argument about the federal
judiciary's imitation of state courts, but it was not on that account
insincere.26 By 1787, a majority of the states provided for tenure
during good behavior.2 7 Although earlier arrangements had re-
flected greater state legislative control of their courts-itself a re-
action to an era of royal dominance 2 -- the movement toward
greater judicial independence in the states had made consider-
able strides by the time Hamilton wrote.29 Of course, in some
states, the removal of judges appointed during good behavior
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 522 (Alexander Hamilton).
23. Id.
24. See id. at 528-30.
25. Id. at 530.
26. Some might disagree. See John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpre-
tation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1660 (2001) (noting that "it is most
unlikely that the Founders would have taken the structural arrangements of any particu-
lar state or set of states to be an appropriate model for federal judicial power").
27. Of the original thirteen states, a majority seem to have provided for tenure during
good behavior, while others provided for a term of years or made continued tenure subject
to legislative will. See EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 105-134
(1944) (indicating that Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York,
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia provided for tenure during good behavior).
Nevertheless, separation of powers concerns may have still been present in the "good be-
havior" states of Delaware and New York. Delaware, for example, made the elected Gov-
ernor the "president" of the state high court. Id. at 106. New York operated under a
scheme that mixed legislative and judicial functions. See SIMEON E. BALDWIN, THE
AMERICAN JUDICIARY 30-31 (1905); see also id. at 19 (noting that Rhode Island and Con-
necticut did not separate legislative from judicial functions).
28. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776) (stating that the
King of Great Britain had "made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of
their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries").
29. Gordon S. Wood concluded that legislative control of state judiciaries was a re-
sponse to earlier royal control, but that it had begun to fall out of favor prior to the fram-
ing of the Constitution. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-1787, at 451-63 (1969).
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
might be accomplished by procedures that were arguably less
cumbersome than impeachment under the proposed Constitu-
tion.3 ' But Hamilton's express reference to state courts as models
for federal courts seems well-founded, and the existence of such
models formed an important part of his argument in selling Arti-
cle III.
While some state courts were deserving of imitation, others
were not, and even those that were imitable could be improved at
the federal level. Hamilton noted that some state courts lacked
provisions for life tenure, and even those that had such protection
did not have salary guarantees quite like those in Article III."'
Invoking "human nature," Hamilton stated in The Federalist No.
79 that "a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power
over his will." 2 By adopting the combination of salary guarantees
along with life tenure, Article III improved upon state court mod-
els by "afford[ing] a better prospect of. .. independence than is
discoverable in the constitutions of any of the states, in regard to
their own judges."33 In this respect, Article III was indeed novel.
Yet despite that novelty and despite the prevalence of other ar-
rangements in the states, tenure during good behavior plus sal-
ary protections for the federal judiciary seemed to draw little
complaint.34
30. See Martha Andes Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English
and American Precedents, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 135, 142, 147 (noting that the constitutions
of Maryland, South Carolina, and Massachusetts provided for gubernatorial removal of
judges upon address of both state houses, with Maryland requiring a two-thirds vote in
each house). The scope of impeachable offenses, moreover, might be articulated differently
than in the proposed Constitution. See id. at 142 (noting that North Carolina's constitu-
tion provided for impeachment for a judge's violation of the state constitution, mal-
administration, or corruption).
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 532 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
32. Id. at 531 (emphasis omitted).
33. Id. at 532; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 7, at 335-36 (James Madi-
son) (criticizing the dependence of certain state judiciaries on their legislatures for subsis-
tence).
34. Anti-Federalists, while apparently content with the concept of good behavior, still
preferred more active political oversight. See Dimino, supra note 1, at 308 (quoting various
Anti-Federalist essayists). Another author of The Federalist, James Madison, feared judi-
cial independence would be compromised by Article III's failure to prevent legislative en-
hancement of judicial salaries. He preferred to fix the salary "by taking for a standard
wheat or some other thing of permanent value." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION OF 1787, at 44-45 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND'S RECORDS].
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In addition, in a few states, legislatures acted as high courts of
appeal, along the lines of the House of Lords in England.35 Such
arrangements could be seen either as subjecting judicial deci-
sionmaking to ultimate legislative control, or as ensuring that
high court "judges"-legislators-were subject to popular control.
Hamilton indicated that such a mechanism of appointment and
removal would cause "too great a disposition to consult popular-
ity.''36 Here too, according to The Federalist No. 78, the federal
judiciary would be modeled on the greater number of states that
kept legislative and judicial branches distinct.37 Far from being
"novel and unprecedented," Article III in this respect was "but a
copy of the constitutions" of the majority of states.38
III. STATE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF
FEDERAL LAW
A. Uniformity
When it came to addressing the scope of Article III in other in-
stallments of The Federalist, concerns for state judicial depend-
ence on political decisionmakers played an important, but not ex-
clusive, role. Article III's inclusion of federal question jurisdiction
provides a representative illustration.39 Hamilton saw two func-
tions being served by this particular grant of jurisdiction as it re-
lates to state courts-ensuring uniformity in the interpretation of
federal law and ensuring that state courts not undermine federal
supremacy. °
35. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 11, at 542-45 (Alexander Hamilton).
Hamilton lists nine states that departed from the English model; the three he does not list
are Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New York. Id. at 544-45.
36. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 49, at 341 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (observing that the
judiciary "by the mode of their appointment, as well as, by the nature and permanency of
it, are too far removed from the people to share much in their prepossessions").
37. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 11, at 544-45 (noting that "the preference
which has been given to these models is highly to be commended").
38. Id.
39. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
40. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 143-44 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961); see also Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A
Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article II, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 831-32
(1984) (referring to these functions as "the now classic dual justifications for the estab-
2004]
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Judicial independence, however, is probably not the most sig-
nificant factor in securing the uniform interpretation of federal
law and the Constitution. The argument that a federal court
should be available to promote such uniformity is addressed to
the fact that, as Hamilton explained, there might be multiple
state courts of last resort rendering "contradictory decisions" on
federal law. 1 "Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction
over the same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in
government, from which nothing but contradiction and confusion
can proceed."42 Thus, no matter what the provisions for judicial
independence in the state courts, uniformity concerns necessarily
require that a single decisionmaker have the last word to resolve
any such contradictions. 3 For example, uniformity concerns
would exist respecting the decisions of multiple lower federal
courts, if Congress created them, even though their judges would
all have the judicial independence safeguards of Article III."
Nevertheless, independence concerns were not entirely irrele-
vant to the question of uniformity, although they appear to be
secondary. Hamilton stated that "[t]o avoid an arbitrary discre-
tion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound
down by strict rules and precedents."45 Presumably, Hamilton
supposed that such constraints would result in greater exercise of
"judgment" and less exercise of "will."46 Yet Hamilton stated that
knowledge of such rules and precedents was achievable only by
"long and laborious study," and their proper application required
"unit[ing] the requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge."47
lishment of a federal judiciary," but noting that "Hamilton was one of the few to assert the
necessity of assuring uniformity of federal law").
41. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 40, at 143 (Alexander Hamilton).
42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
43. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 40, at 143-44 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting
the necessity of having one "paramount" court "to settle and declare in the last resort, an
uniform rule" and to resolve "endless diversities in the opinions of men").
44. Disuniformity might also adversely impact the confidence of other governments.
See id. at 144.
45. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton).
46. See supra note 9. Mark Tushnet points out that while Hamilton satisfactorily ex-
plained why there may be little to fear from an independent judiciary's own transgressions
of legislative authority, he did not explain satisfactorily why a politically insulated judge
is more likely to exercise "judgment," rather than "will." Mark Tushnet, Constitutional In-
terpretation and Judicial Selection: A View from The Federalist Papers, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1669, 1687 (1988).
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 529-30 (Alexander Hamilton); see also
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 11, at 544 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting different
[Vol. 38:675
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Life tenure, he argued, enables the federal judiciary to attract
and retain those few "fit characters" with the requisite learning,
integrity, and professional habits of mind that distinguish judicial
from legislative decisionmakers."
These observations about the judicial function suggest that
Hamilton supposed that decisions from courts with Article III-
style protections might prove somewhat more stable on matters of
federal law than decisions of courts lacking such protections.49
His observation might also suggest that Hamilton perceived that
the Supreme Court itself would be more inclined to conform to its
own settled precedents and fixed constitutional meanings than a
court that lacked such protections. ° As Mark Tushnet has re-
marked, these observations indicate that The Federalist seemed
to contemplate a "restrictive theory" of constitutional interpreta-
tion in which law's meaning was not radically indeterminate.5'
But, because even independent judges could be expected to dis-
agree in their exercise of judgment, what was critical for uniform-
ity purposes was that final decisionmaking authority be able to be
lodged in a single judicial body.52
'qualifications which fit" the legislative, as opposed to the judicial character, and fearing
that "the pestilential breath of faction" might overcome a less permanent judiciary).
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 530 (Alexander Hamilton).
49. See THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 40, at 143-44 (Alexander Hamilton).
Hamilton argued that, when ultimate judicial power remains vested in the states, "[tihe
faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole union, are thus continually at the mercy of
the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of every member of which it is composed."
Id. at 144. See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 42, at 535-36 (Alexander Hamil-
ton) (discussing the extent of the federal judiciary).
50. Cf. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
519, 525-29 (2003) (discussing the Founders' expectations that ambiguities in constitu-
tional meanings would become fixed and settled by early interpretation).
51. See Tushnet, supra note 46, at 1689; see also Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Per-
spective in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the
Judiciary's Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 19-27 (2000). Molot notes that for judicial
independence to matter within the Founders' framework "law had to be moderately but
not radically indeterminate." Id. at 19. Tushnet concludes, however, that such a theory of
interpretation is "severely impaired" in light of modern developments in the philosophy of
language and meaning. Tushnet, supra note 46, at 1696.
52. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 40, at 143 (Alexander Hamilton).
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B. Supremacy
In other respects, however, provision for a federal judiciary to
interpret and administer federal law was heavily influenced by
state separation of powers concerns and the relative lack of judi-
cial independence in some of the states. For example, Hamilton
stated in The Federalist No. 22 that "the laws of the whole are in
danger of being contravened by the laws of the parts."3 He ar-
gued that if only state courts were relied upon to interpret and
enforce federal law, problems would arise "besides the contradic-
tions"-besides the disuniform decisions that would exist without
a superintending court.54 Here, Hamilton's concern is not with
consistency or uniformity in the interpretation of federal law in
the abstract, but the risk of underenforcement of federal law by
the states and their courts.55
Hamilton explained in this regard that there is "much to fear
from the bias of local views and prejudices, and from the interfer-
ence of local regulations."" Hamilton argued that state law would
be favored over federal law because state and local decisionmak-
ers would tend to favor the law that gave them their power, as
"nothing is more natural to men in office, than to look with pecu-
liar deference towards that authority to which they owe their offi-
cial existence." 7 This argument rehearses that of The Federalist
No. 78 where Hamilton makes a similar observation about those
toward whom federal judges would feel beholden absent Article
III's protections." His fear in The Federalist No. 22 is that, the
Supremacy Clause notwithstanding, state judicial decisionmak-
ers "acting under the authority of those Legislatures" might hold
unconstitutional state laws constitutional, or enforce state law in
preference to conflicting federal law even when federal law was
otherwise constitutional.59
53. Id. at 144.
54. Id.
55. See also Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87 (emphasizing review
of cases in which claims of right under federal law in opposition to state law had gone un-
derenforced, as opposed to cases in which federal law was arguably overenforced).
56. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 40, at 144 (Alexander Hamilton).
57. Id.
58. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
59. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 40, at 144 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Hamilton's subsequent argument in The Federalist No. 80 also
reinforces the idea that the dependence of some state courts on
their legislatures justifies provision for a national judiciary with
power to resolve cases arising under federal law.6" Unlike The
Federalist No. 78, which focuses mainly on judicial enforcement of
limits on the national government,61 The Federalist No. 80 focuses
on Article I's limitations on the states, such as "[t] he imposition of
duties on imported articles, and the emission of paper money."62
While uniformity issues may be a part of such concerns, they are
clearly not the only, or perhaps even the dominant, concern.
Hamilton noted that state actors might not "scrupulously" regard
the prohibitions, absent some superintending power "to restrain
or correct the infractions of them.
63
The state actors to whom Hamilton was presumably referring
were the political branches of the states, which he saw as poised
to ignore constitutional limits on them absent a judicial check.
But he also necessarily made a statement about state courts to
the extent that he perceived that it might take a federal judiciary
to supply that check. 64 Hamilton looked back to the events of the
Constitution's framing and found that there either had to be "a
direct negative on the state laws"-for example, by the national
legislature, a proposal fought for by James Madison and others-
"or an authority in the federal courts."65 Hamilton said "[tihere is
no third course that I can imagine."66 That state separation of
powers concerns were central to Article III's provision for federal
question jurisdiction is also confirmed in The Federalist No. 81,67
in which Hamilton defended the Constitution's grant of power to
Congress to create inferior federal courts.6" There, Hamilton
60. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 42 (Alexander Hamilton).
61. See infra Part IV.
62. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 42, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton).
63. Id.
64. For a similar assessment of modern state courts in constitutional litigation, see
Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1127 (1977) (noting political
insulation of federal courts as one factor helping to secure "sustained enforcement of coun-
termajoritarian constitutional norms").
65. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 42, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton).
66. Id. Despite Hamilton's belief, a third course would have been to rely solely on
state courts for the final administration of federal law and the Constitution, but presuma-
bly Hamilton supposed that such a course would not have achieved the ends of which he
spoke.
67. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 11 (Alexander Hamilton).
68. See id. at 546-52.
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pointed to the political dependency of those state courts where
judges held office "during pleasure, or from year to year" as a
chief justification for enabling lower federal courts to hear cases
involving the "national laws" and to ensure their "inflexible exe-
cution."69
Perhaps Hamilton thought that even state judges with life ten-
ure would hold biases in favor of state law, thus making judicial
independence of uncertain relevance to the problem of under-
enforcement of federal law. His observation elsewhere that per-
manence in office would minimize improper judicial deference to
the appointing power seems to leave room for the possibility that
some residual bias in favor of the government that appointed
them might nevertheless remain.7' But that same observation
suggests that he likely saw much less to fear from life-tenured
state judiciaries, even if he were to agree that state courts re-
tained some residual appointing-power bias.71 In addition, Article
III's focus in this regard had to be on the weakest links among
the state courts, not on the "most approved" of them.72
Of course, a similar appointing-power bias might infect federal
judicial decisionmakers, resulting in possible overenforcement of
federal law at the expense of state law. Some Anti-Federalists ex-
pressed fear of a lack of independence of federally approved
judges, along with concerns about their possible class biases.73 As
Jack Rakove has noted, Anti-Federalists worried that a federal
judiciary would act as "an agent of arbitrary power," especially if
69. Id. at 547.
70. The Federalist No. 78 recognized that deference to the appointing power would be
diminished in Article III-style decisionmakers, even if it was not altogether eliminated.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1; see also supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
71. Hamilton did not discuss the reverse prospect-that because state judges are po-
litically insulated from the federal political branches, they might be relied on as reliable
enforcers of federal law and the Constitution against federal legislative or executive
branch overreaching. But Congress would presumably be permitted to make that assess-
ment.
72. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 522 (Alexander Hamilton).
73. See, e.g., 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 539 (2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (re-
marks of Patrick Henry in the Virginia Ratifying Convention against ratification); Letters
from The Federal Farmer XV, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 315-
20; see also Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by Correcting
the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 397, 422 (1999) (noting
that the Seventh Amendment's civil jury guarantee was viewed as a check on the federal
judiciary, including its feared class biases and pro-nationalist outlook).
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it acted without civil juries as Article III seemed to suppose it
might.74 The Federalist's response was again to point to the safe-
guards of Article III, which James Madison indicated "must soon
destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring
them."75 In any event, the uncertain risk of some overenforcement
of federal law by life-tenured federal decisionmakers, who may
have felt some residual allegiance to the government that ap-
pointed them, might have been seen as preferable to the more
certain risk of its continued underenforcement, as had occurred
under the Articles of Confederation.
IV. STATE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE IMPARTIAL
ADMINISTRATION OF LAW
As noted above, enforcing constitutional limits on legislative
action, whether federal or state, is not the only justification Ham-
ilton gave in favor of a life-tenured judiciary. "[I]t is not with a
view to infractions of the constitution only that the independence
of the judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of
occasional ill humours in the society." 6 Hamilton then added that
"in any government," not just in republics, an independent judici-
ary was the "best expedient" for securing "upright and impartial
administration of the laws."" Here, Hamilton's focus was on "pri-
vate rights," as distinguished from what he called "the rights of
the constitution."" The dual functions of judicial independence as
an aid in securing enforcement of the Constitution on the one
hand, and the impartial enforcement of ordinary rights on the
other, is a frequent theme of The Federalist No. 78." Hamilton's
74. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 148, 322 (1996).
75. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 348 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). In
addition, Madison asserted in The Federalist No. 39 that "impartiality" will inhere in the
decisions of a national tribunal given the "most effectual precautions ... to secure [it]."
THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 256 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see also
RAKOVE, supra note 74, at 187 (referring to this as "Madison's bland assertion of the 'im-
partiality' of federal judges").
76. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 528 (Alexander Hamilton).
77. Id. at 522.
78. Id. at 528-29. Despite the contrast, Hamilton does not suggest that the "rights of
the constitution" could be enforced other than through the vehicle of cases that raised
some claim of denial of a private right. Id. at 529. Rather, "private rights" here seems to
refer to rights that might not implicate any constitutional questions.
79. See, e.g., id. at 528 (referring to "rights of the constitution and of individuals"); id.
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suggestion was that independent judges would be less likely to
play favorites in such private rights cases, and would have the
freedom to develop habits of mind that countered arbitrariness in
decisionmaking and promoted the rule of law in more ordinary
cases.
80
Such "impartial administration"8 1 concerns would seem to be
addressed to combating possible influences on judicial decision-
making even apart from ones stemming directly from the political
branches.8 2 Yet Hamilton believed that this concern for impartial
administration was sometimes linked to legislative action as well.
After referring to the role of an independent judiciary in connec-
tion with the "ill humours" that produce unconstitutional legisla-
tion, he noted that judicial independence is also a safeguard
against other "ill humours" which "sometimes extend no farther
than to the injury of the private rights of particular classes of
citizens, by unjust and partial laws." 3
Hamilton's distinction between unconstitutional laws and "un-
just and partial laws" is intriguing, to the extent that it suggests
he might have supposed that an independent federal judiciary
could provide a barrier to bad lawmaking even if it was not un-
constitutional lawmaking.8 4 Hamilton was not suggesting that
laws, otherwise constitutional, could be overturned simply be-
cause they were unjust or partial. 5 Rather, he indicated that an
independent judiciary can "mitigat[e] the severity[] and confin[e]
the operation of such laws." 6 In so doing, he said, an independent
judiciary could deter future legislative adventures by putting the
at 522 (referring to the "political rights of the constitution"); id. at 528 (speaking ofjudicial
independence "not with a view to infractions of the constitution only," but also "injury of
the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial laws").
80. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and
the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 728-29 (1995) (referring to this as "unbiased ad-
ministration of day-to-day justice"); Burbank, supra note 21, at 336 (noting Hamilton's di-
chotomy).
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 522 (Alexander Hamilton).
82. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Origins and History of Federal Judicial Independ-
ence, in AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: REPORT OF THE ABA COMM'N ON SEPARATION OF
POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, app. A (1997) (referring to this as "decisional" in-
dependence in contrast to "institutional" independence).
83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 528 (Alexander Hamilton).
84. Id.
85. See SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 82-83
(1990).
86. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 528 (Alexander Hamilton).
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legislature on notice of what was in store for them." Hamilton
then alluded to practices through which "the integrity and mod-
eration" of the courts has "already been felt in more states than
one."8 On this score, Hamilton appeared to be endorsing a theory
of equitable interpretation of statutes, consistent with late eight-
eenth century judicial practice. 9
Although Hamilton did not spell out his examples, he was
clearly referring to the actions of some of the more independent
state judiciaries in checking their legislatures in this manner.9 °
For Hamilton, life tenure allowed the judiciary to ride out the
more temporary winds of faction that might produce either un-
constitutional or partial and unjust laws.91 Arguably, Hamilton
offered these state courts as a model for the federal courts in con-
nection with the administration of federal law, although he did
not say so explicitly.92 In addition, to the extent that federal
87. See DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 189-90 (1984)
(connecting this independent role with advancement of the "public good").
88. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 528 (Alexander Hamilton).
89. See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 1038-39, 1050-53, 1056-57. John Manning offers a
different reading of this "debatable" passage of Hamilton's. See Manning, supra note 26, at
1668 n.92. Manning argues that Hamilton's statements are consistent with a view that
such ameliorative readings of statutes will occur only in cases of statutory ambiguity. Id.
Perhaps such a reading is possible. But the difficulty with it is that Hamilton refers to ju-
dicial narrowing of "unjust and partial laws," not to ambiguous laws or even to ambiguous
"unjust and partial" laws. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 528 (Alexander Hamil-
ton). Moreover, in both his discussion of unconstitutional laws and unjust or partial laws,
Hamilton's concern is with judicial remedying of legislative "ill humours," not legislative
imprecision. See id. at 527; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 11, at 543-44
(Alexander Hamilton) (observing, in connection with proposals to have the legislature ex-
ercise judicial authority, that "[firom a body which had had even a partial agency in pass-
ing bad laws, we could rarely expect a disposition to temper and moderate them in the ap-
plication"). In addition, Manning suggests that instances of broad equitable interpretation
by state courts was somehow linked with nonindependent judiciaries. See Manning, supra
note 26, at 1662-65. But Hamilton, at least, seems to have made precisely the opposite
link by discussing these examples as part of his argument in favor of judicial independ-
ence and life tenure. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 528 (Alexander Hamil-
ton).
90. William Eskridge suggests that Hamilton's own law practice had given rise to one
such state court example. See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 1050 & n.306.
91. See Tushnet, supra note 46, at 1680 (seeing a reference to "faction" in Hamilton's
language: "ill humours which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular con-
junctures," THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 527); see also THE FEDERALIST NO.
10, at 57 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (noting how temporary legislative
majorities can form to deprive minorities and individuals of rights).
92. This, for example, is how Judge Posner reads this passage. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 308-09 n.16 (1996) (viewing
Hamilton's suggestion as "an invitation to judges to set their own sense of justice against
that embodied in legislation, and in the guise of interpretation to make legislation more
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
courts might also be involved in the administration and enforce-
ment of state law under provisions such as diversity jurisdiction,
Hamilton may have envisioned a similarly aggressive federal role
to mitigate the harshness of unjust and impartial state laws af-
fecting "the private rights of particular classes of citizens."93 I dis-
cuss this prospect in the following section.
V. STATE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF
NON-FEDERAL LAW
Concern over state judicial dependence also features promi-
nently, but not exclusively, in The Federalist's defense of the
scope of Article III more generally-for example, in areas unre-
lated to the enforcement of constitutional limits or the admini-
stration of federal law. In The Federalist No. 80, Hamilton laid
out a number of general goals to be served by a federal judiciary,
including, for example, the resolution of cases on which "the
PEACE of the CONFEDERACY" depended and those in which "state
tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial."94 He listed other
case categories as well.95 Hamilton then proceeded to indicate into
which of those various groupings the actual grants of jurisdiction
in Article III happen to fall.96 Chief among those in which state
judicial dependence played a leading role were those categories
that Hamilton viewed as based on the possible bias or partiality
of state judges.97 Independence played an important but some-
what less prominent role in connection with cases that fall under
the peace-of-the-confederacy rubric.9" Of course, some of the cases
and controversies to which the federal judicial power extends par-
take of more than one of Hamilton's general categories.
civilized in application than it was in intention"). Importantly, Hamilton did not consider
this to be an example of judicial usurpation. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 11, at
546 (Alexander Hamilton).
93. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 528 (Alexander Hamilton); see also infra
notes 149-54 and accompanying text. Impartiality in the administration of law was also
enhanced in independent judiciaries by what was supposed to be their greater tendency to
adhere to precedent. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
94. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 42, at 534 (Alexander Hamilton).
95. These categories include cases arising under federal laws; admiralty and maritime
cases; those in which the United States was a party; and those that "concern the execution
of the provisions expressly contained in the [Constitution]." Id.
96. See id. at 538-41.
97. See id. at 535-38.
98. See id.
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A. Partiality
Hamilton treated the rationale for enabling the federal judici-
ary to hear those cases in which "state tribunals cannot be sup-
posed to be impartial" as almost too obvious for explanation.9 He
connected it with the ancient maxim that no man should be a
judge in his own case, suggesting that there were cases in which
state courts would identify with the interests of their own state
and/or its citizens.00 Yet the only cases that he placed exclusively
into this category were suits between citizens of the same state
claiming land based on grants from different states. 101 It was also
the only group in which Article III "directly contemplates the
cognizance of disputes between citizens of the same state."' 2 "The
courts of neither of the [interested] states could be expected to be
unbiassed," Hamilton said, because "it would be natural that the
judges, as men, should feel a strong predilection to the claims of
their own government. °1 0 3 He even went so far as to say that the
laws of the respective states might have to be ignored in such
cases, since they may have "tied the courts down to decisions in
favour of the grants of the state to which they belonged."' 4
Perhaps such a natural bias would exist in state judiciaries
without regard to safeguards for judicial independence.' 5 As
Hamilton elsewhere made clear, however, the "strong predilec-
99. Id. at 534, 538 (stating that this category "speaks for itself').
100. Id. at 538.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 540 (emphasis omitted). As Joseph Story would later point out, the Consti-
tution "indirectly" contemplated jurisdiction over suits between citizens of the same state
in a number of areas, such as in cases arising under federal law. 3 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1690 (Hilliard, Gray, and
Co. 1833).
103. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 42, at 538 (Alexander Hamilton); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 40, at 144 (Alexander Hamilton) (making a similar state-
ment about appointment-power deference of politically dependent state courts in clashes
between state and federal law); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 522-23 (Alexan-
der Hamilton) (making a similar statement about appointment-power deference gener-
ally).
104. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 42, at 538 (Alexander Hamilton). Were the
unconstitutionality of a state's laws the expected sticking point in such cases, they might
have been accounted for through federal question jurisdiction. But Hamilton's statement
suggests that even constitutional state laws might have to be ignored, or one state's laws
preferred over another's. Thus, something besides federal question jurisdiction would be
needed to accomplish such a result.
105. Id,
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tion" in favor of one's own government, like that in favor of the
appointing power, was one that was substantially undercut by
such protection."' And as noted above, Article III had to account
for the least common denominator among state courts, not the
most exemplary. Besides, a federal court-not having attachment
to any state appointing power-might have been thought to lack
whatever lingering residue of home-state bias even an independ-
ent state judiciary might be supposed to retain, although Hamil-
ton did not mention the possibility. But Hamilton did suggest
that an independent and disinterested judge, unlike a possibly in-
terested and dependent one, could more readily ignore an uncon-
stitutional law in the context of suits involving competing states'
land grants, and at least mitigate the severity of harsh or unjust
laws.1 °7
B. Peace of the Confederacy
Hamilton's category of cases that implicate the peace of the
confederacy is reminiscent of a similar grouping employed during
the framing of the Constitution.0 8 There, "the national peace and
harmony" was used as a catchall for cases other than those aris-
ing under federal law or the Constitution to which federal judicial
power might extend. 0 9 This category was eventually made more
specific, and it would include the various party-based grants of
jurisdiction, a few of which are discussed below, along with other
grants of jurisdiction.
Hamilton saw this category as referring to cases in which judi-
cial decisionmaking by the constituent "parts" of the Union-the
states-might risk injury to "the whole."1 While issues of parti-
ality or bias, along with issues of judicial dependence, are often
implicated in peace-of-the-confederacy cases, Hamilton treated
peace-of-the-confederacy concerns as potentially independent of
106. Id.
107. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 527-28 (Alexander Hamilton). A
neutral third state might have filled the bill, provided its judges enjoyed protections such
as those in Article III, but at a risk to principles of equality among states by setting one
state judiciary over the others. The arguable location(s) of the disputed property might
also limit the states in which such suits could have been filed.
108. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 42, at 534 (Alexander Hamilton).
109. 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 34, at 133, 147.
110. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 42, at 535-36 (Alexander Hamilton).
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such issues. That is because the risk of affront to another state or
a foreign government might be unrelated either to the independ-
ence of the state judicial system that rendered the adverse judg-
ment, or to the actual presence of partiality or its risk. The peace-
of-the-confederacy rationale also appears to encompass a concern
for feelings of confidence among outsiders and their governments,
and to that extent also focuses on fears of partiality, whatever
their reality.'11
1. Suits Between States
A state suing or being sued in another state's courts by that
other state, for example, could well be suspicious of any judgment
rendered against it, without regard to the judicial protections of
the judges of the judgment-rendering state. Whether such suspi-
cion was well-founded might be somewhat beside the point if in-
terstate harmony, and the risk of war between states, is the con-
cern. Only a third-party adjudicator could effectively eliminate
that fear, or at least neutralize it for the contending states. That
is why, under the Articles of Confederation, such disputes were
resolved finally by Congress.' Selection of a neutral third state
might have been an option for resolving such cases, but it is not
clear how much that would have alleviated possible suspicion
that two states were in cahoots against the loser, or that there
was something to be gained by the judgment-rendering state. '13
Of course, the potential for actual bias is at work here as well,
not just its perception, at least within Hamilton's framework that
viewed judicial decisionmakers as tending to favor their own gov-
111. Similar peace-of-the-confederacy concerns might lurk in a state court's decision
that slighted a sister state's title in litigation over different states' land grants, notwith-
standing the impartiality or independence of its judges. But only the claims of co-citizens
are covered by that grant of jurisdiction, thus somewhat minimizing such concerns. Plus,
diversity jurisdiction would have been available to pick up similar land-title disputes be-
tween citizens of different states. Although Hamilton does not mention peace-of-the-
confederacy concerns as a basis for jurisdiction in such land grant disputes, Joseph Story
later would by noting that a disinterested court would aid "in quieting the jealousies, and
disarming the resentments of the state." 3 STORY, supra note 102, § 1690.
112. See id. § 1674.
113. Even if the third state's judiciary had independence guarantees like those in Arti-
cle I1, that might not be enough to bury such suspicion. The idea of being judged by a sis-
ter state, no matter how neutral or disinterested, might not sit well in a political commu-
nity in which all states are created equal.
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ernments to the degree that they are not independent of their leg-
islatures. Indeed, Hamilton acknowledged that the partiality
principle and the idea that no one should be a judge in his own
case "has no inconsiderable weight" in the category of suits be-
tween states."4 In addition, the perception of partiality in such
cases is not always unrelated to the risk of actual partiality. Such
a perception would obviously be magnified to the extent that in-
terstate disputes might be left to a state court that was interested
in the litigation and lacking in Article III-style protections.
By contrast, a decision by a life-tenured judge without a stake
in the outcome might reduce suspicion on the part of the losing
state concerning partiality of a judgment in suits between states.
Placement of such jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of the
United States as an original matter might also have provided an
additional measure of confidence among the litigants, whatever
other purpose it may have served. In addition, as Hamilton else-
where suggested, a politically insulated federal decisionmaker
might be able to mitigate any potential offense to the loser in
shaping the final judgment in an interstate dispute, thus helping
to secure the peace of the Union." 5 And, if offense were to be
taken by the losing state to the Article III court's judgment, it
would at least be directed at the more distant and diffuse central
government, not at another state.
Here, of course, Hamilton was simultaneously relying on the
federal judiciary's independence while also assuming some resid-
ual identification with the interests of the Union-identification
that judicial independence is ordinarily designed to break, unless
the state action in question runs afoul of federal law or the Con-
stitution." 6 The concession was therefore double-edged and
threatened to undermine Hamilton's recognition elsewhere that
government-allegiance issues were significantly present only in
nonindependent courts. But perhaps Hamilton simply recognized
that some such residual bias would inhere even in independent
judiciaries, federal or state, if only to a limited degree, and that
sometimes, it could be a good thing.
114. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 42, at 538 (Alexander Hamilton); see also id.
at 540 (stating that suits between states belong to the peace-of-the-confederacy category,
as do diversity suits and suits between states and citizens of other states, and partake in
some measure of the partiality category).
115. Id. at 535-36.
116. See id.
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2. Alienage
According to Hamilton, alienage jurisdiction rests on concerns
for the peace of the confederacy exclusively.117 One of Hamilton's
justifications for alienage jurisdiction was that judgments against
aliens by tribunals other than the national government's might
be viewed negatively either by the litigant or by his parent coun-
try."'8 Here, Hamilton's concern would seem to be over the fear of
underenforcement of rights-"the denial or perversion of jus-
tice"-associated with an alien's losing effort. 1 9 Just as in the set-
ting of suits between states, suspicion of favoritism on behalf of
United States citizens could exist without regard to the protec-
tions enjoyed by a state's judges or actual partiality in their deci-
sionmaking.12 °
More importantly, the perceived failure to do ordinary justice
to an alien in citizen-alien disputes would be a matter for which
the United States would be answerable at the international
level. "'21 And a disregard or misapplication of the law of nations-
law that Hamilton supposed might frequently be implicated in
connection with litigation involving aliens-could produce similar
consequences.' 22 As Hamilton pointed out, whether alienage cases
implicated questions of federal treaties or law of nations, or only
questions of municipal law, denial of justice concerns might in-
here in any adverse verdict to an alien, and become a source for
international reprisal. 2 3 Because the United States would be "an-
swerable" in such cases, "the responsibility for an injury ought
ever to be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it."'24 As
117. See id. at 535-36, 541.
118. Id. at 536.
119. Id.
120. A judgment might or might not have been erroneous, and error might not have
been the result of impartiality in the judiciary, but it is easy to imagine that an adverse
judgment in such a setting would be linked in the mind of the foreign observer to partial-
ity, whether legislative or judicial.
121. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 42, at 536 (Alexander Hamilton).
122. Whatever their status today, law of nations questions probably would not have
been perceived as presenting federal questions, thus making alienage jurisdiction one of
the primary vehicles by which federal courts might review such questions. See Curtis A.
Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INTL L. 587 (2002) (discussing
the non-federal nature of the law of nations).
123. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 568 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
124. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 42, at 536 (Alexander Hamilton). See gener.
ally Michael G. Collins, The Diversity Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 42 VA. J. INT'L L.
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was true of certain other peace-of-the-confederacy cases like in-
terstate disputes, alienage jurisdiction gave the federal govern-
ment-through its independent judges-the ability to oversee
and, as Hamilton described, "mitigate" any harm,125 or perhaps
even the perception of harm, for which the federal government
might be held responsible.126 As a consequence, a "part" would be
less able to subject "the whole" to a cause for war.12 7
As with other peace-of-the-confederacy categories, perception of
partiality was likely not the only problem, or one that was always
unrelated to actual partiality or its risk. During the era of Con-
federation, there had been high profile cases in which aliens fared
poorly, and which resulted in judgments that were very likely
partial, in addition to being perceived as such.128 Although Hamil-
ton does not include alienage jurisdiction as partaking of the
state court partiality category, others at the time believed that
alienage jurisdiction's best defense was that it "secur[ed] the
United States from the danger of controversies ... under the par-
tial decisions of those of the individual states."129
649, 658-660 (2002) (discussing Hamilton's treatment of law of nations and alien related
jurisdictional grants in The Federalist No. 80).
125. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 528 (Alexander Hamilton).
126. See id.
127. Even admiralty jurisdiction was said to partake in some measure of the peace-of-
the-confederacy rationale, and to that extent therefore relies only partly on the structural
protections afforded state judges. Admiralty cases frequently involve foreigners, and their
public law side-prize and capture cases-involve risks of offense to foreign sovereigns
which would otherwise be out of the hands of the United States. THE FEDERALIST No. 80,
supra note 42, at 538 (Alexander Hamilton).
128. See, e.g., Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789,
and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421 (viewing discriminatory non-
enforcement of ordinary obligations owed aliens as a chief reason for establishing the fed-
eral judiciary); John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 24 (1948) ("There can be no doubt, for example, of direct bias in the
administration of justice against British creditors."). Bias could lie in legislative restric-
tions on alien recovery of debts-as it often did-or in judicial administration.
129. James Monroe, Some Observations on the Constitution, in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 303-04; see also Letter from Timothy Pickering to Charles
Tillinghast (Dec. 24, 1787), reprinted in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFI-
CATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 193, 204 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds.,
1983) (focusing on "impartial" forums to avoid states' "unjust" and "partially unjust" laws).
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3. Diversity Jurisdiction
As he did with suits between states, Hamilton pigeonholed di-
versity into two categories: (1) peace-of-the-confederacy and (2)
state court partiality.3 ° As noted above, these categories can im-
plicate both judicial independence' 3 ' and nonindependence-relat-
ed concerns. Chief among the nonindependence-related concerns
would again be the fear, whatever the reality, that a judgment by
a state court in favor of its own citizens was not an impartial
one. 132 Such a concern was common to all party-based categories
of jurisdiction in which the interests of competing governments
were aligned against one another, such as interstate disputes,
alienage jurisdiction, and even disputes regarding competing
state land grants.
Here, too, suspicion was not the only problem. As another Rati-
fication-era defender of the Constitution observed with respect to
diversity, "there may happen a variety of cases, where the dis-
trust and suspicion may not be altogether destitute of a just
foundation."133 Hamilton's specific justification for diversity juris-
diction focused heavily on the possibility that local prejudice
might readily manifest itself against outsiders in a less than fully
independent judiciary.3 Specifically, he argued that Article III's
diversity provision was designed to implement Article IV's inter-
state Privileges and Immunities Clause-a clause that was cre-
130. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 42, at 540 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton
stated that diversity partakes of the impartiality rationale only "in some measure." Id.
Elsewhere he said that the impartiality rationale carries "no inconsiderable weight" in jus-
tifying diversity. Id. at 538.
131. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence
and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 481 (1986) (linking diversity
rationale to concerns over state court independence).
132. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Consti-
tutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 278 (1992) (noting that di-
versity was designed to alleviate such fears).
133. Remarks by Alexander Contee Hanson, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE 1787-1788, at
238 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 2000) (1888).
134. See supra Part V.B.2. Not everyone would agree. See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Hid-
den Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 119, 124, 128 (2003) (stating that
"[1little historical documentation" supports the prejudice-against-out-of-state-litigants ra-
tionale for diversity and referring to Hamilton's statements as "general and merely sug-
gest[ing] the need for an impartial forum"). I believe that Hamilton's remarks are very
precisely related to the problem of in-state bias against non-resident litigants, both feared
and actual, whether arising from state legislatures or state judiciaries.
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ated to enforce interstate equality among United States citizens
and to insure that no state treated out-of-state citizens differently
than in-state citizens with respect to certain rights.135 The provi-
sion for federal jurisdiction to enforce interstate equality suggests
that for Hamilton there was a real question whether state courts
could always be counted on to do so.
136
Henry Friendly derided Hamilton's Article IV rationale for di-
versity jurisdiction, pointing out that if a state enacted a law hos-
tile to out-of-state citizens, it would present a federal question
that could be considered in the exercise of the federal courts' fed-
eral question jurisdiction.1 37 Diversity jurisdiction would therefore
not be needed to take care of a violation of Article IV. Friendly
made the point as part of his argument that, for the Framers, di-
versity jurisdiction was not really aimed at redressing local
prejudice against out-of-state citizens by state judiciaries. 3 ' In-
stead, Friendly claimed that diversity was mainly designed to
blunt the force of certain pro-debtor remedial legislation and per-
haps anti-creditor bias more generally.'39 But Hamilton made
clear that the problem with state court adjudication of suits that
pitted in-state and out-of-state citizens against one another was
more than just discriminatory state laws-i.e., the "equality of
privileges." 4 ° He noted that such disputes also present a risk of
"evasion and subterfuge" of interstate equality.' The evasion
and subterfuge language suggests that Hamilton may have seen
Article IV as addressed to discrimination by the state judiciary
(and its juries) in the interpretation or administration of possibly
neutral state laws. And he viewed diversity jurisdiction as de-
135. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 42, at 537-38 (Alexander Hamilton).
136. Id.
137. Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV.
483, 492 n.44 (1928) (referring to it as "[olne of the most specious arguments" in favor of
diversity jurisdiction). Friendly was largely dismissive of Hamilton's focus on "local preju-
dice," or even the fear of it, as a rationale for diversity. Friendly believed that "the real
fear" that prompted the diversity provision "was not of state courts so much as of state leg-
islatures." Id. at 495. As discussed in the text, Friendly was probably right that certain
state laws that were otherwise constitutional, were a likely focus of diversity. Hamilton,
however, suggested that they were not diversity's exclusive focus. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 130-36.
138. Friendly, supra note 137, at 492 n.44.
139. Id. at 495-97.
140. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 42, at 537 (Alexander Hamilton).
141. See id.
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signed to secure against it.1 2 This language also shows that Ham-
ilton was not only focused on problems associated with the per-
ception of partiality among state judiciaries, but on its reality as
well.
Friendly was right that state laws which facially discriminate
against out-of-state citizens might be easily handled under the
rubric of federal question jurisdiction on direct review. To that ex-
tent, diversity might be redundant of such jurisdiction. But it is
less clear that federal question jurisdiction could have handled
the problem of "evasion and subterfuge" in the interpretation and
administration of state law. First, it is open to serious doubt
whether ad hoc discrimination on the basis of state citizenship by
a state court would have presented a federal question at the time
Hamilton wrote.'43 If it did not, only the provision for diversity ju-
risdiction would have allowed for federal court involvement in po-
licing state courts in their interpretation and administration of
state law. And even if it did, it might have been difficult to police
such subtle forms of discrimination under the aegis of federal
question jurisdiction, especially if lower courts had gone uncre-
ated and review of state court decisionmaking was available in
the Supreme Court only after the fact.'44 Diversity, however, pro-
vides a prophylactic basis of jurisdiction that does not require
proof of actual discrimination in each case, based in part on the
assumption that discrimination may occur often enough, and
might otherwise be difficult to show."4
Hamilton made no bones about the potential structural superi-
ority of federal courts to administer state law in such settings,
and focused once again on the problem of loyalty to the appoint-
142. See id.
143. See Hessel E. Yntema & George H. Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Ju-
risdiction, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 869, 870-71 n. 1 (1931) (expressing similar doubt).
144. This would be true even with broad review of fact on appeal-something that Arti-
cle III would have allowed for and something that terrified the Anti-Federalists who
wanted a constitutional provision to insulate jury factfinding. See Ann Woolhandler & Mi-
chael G. Collins, The Article III Jury, 87 VA. L. REV. 587, 595 n.21 (2001) (discussing Anti-
Federalist commentary).
145. If diversity jurisdiction were exercised on direct review, it might have required
some ability to second-guess determinations of state law, factfinding, and application of
law to fact. In addition, while creation of lower federal courts may not have been constitu-
tionally compelled, diversity jurisdiction exercised by federal trial courts could handle-if
one believed, as Hamilton did, in the neutral forum rationale for diversity-the more sub-
tle forms of discrimination that might enter in at the judicial stage by filtering them out ex
ante.
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ing power.14 6 Because a federal court will "ow[e] its official exis-
tence to the union" it will not likely feel a similar "bias" toward
the state of one of the contestant litigants as would an interested
state court.147 Perception of bias problems would presumably be
reduced for a similar reason. Here, too, Hamilton focused on the
significance of the political branches in the appointment of fed-
eral judges, but only to make the point that the federal court
would lack any relevant appointing-power deference-i.e., to a
government that was involved in the litigation. To be sure, such
disinterestedness in the federal courts-"no local attach-
ments""4 -would likely exist without regard to the respective
protections for independence of the federal judiciary.'49 But, as
Hamilton argued elsewhere, it was the occasional want of such
protections at the state level that made local prejudice against
out-of-state litigants a more troublesome possibility in the first
place. 5 °
In addition, Hamilton's recognition in The Federalist No. 78
that an independent judiciary could better provide "impartial
administration of the laws" and redress for "injury of the private
rights of particular classes of citizens, [caused] by unjust and par-
tial laws," might have especial application in the diversity set-
ting."' For example, state debtor relief laws that disfavored the
creditor class could be subject to a Contract Clause challenge if
they operated retrospectively.1 52 But other laws, such as state in-
stallment laws, might not present a problem under the Contract
Clause nor facially discriminate against out-of-state citizens.'53
The harshness of such partial but possibly constitutional laws di-
146. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 42, at 537-38 (Alexander Hamilton).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 537.
149. In the Judiciary Act of 1789, neutral state courts were entrusted with diversity
actions, to the exclusion of federal courts, so long as neither party was a citizen of the neu-
tral state. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (providing for diversity ju-
risdiction when "the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a
citizen of another State"); id. at § 12 (limiting removal to out-of-state defendants sued in
the state of which the plaintiffwas a citizen).
150. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 123, at 571-72 (Alexander Hamilton).
151. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 522, 528 (Alexander Hamilton).
152. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
153. Installment laws might permit a debtor to pay off a debt over a longer term than
that contemplated by the original debt instrument. See 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
73, at 159-60 (remarking that diversity jurisdiction would permit federal courts to ignore
such "iniquitous" installment laws).
[Vol. 38:675
A VIEW FROM THE FEDERALIST
rected against the creditor class-and as a matter of disparate
impact perhaps, directed against out-of-state citizens and aliens
-is precisely what Hamilton seemed to suppose independent
judges could and should try to mitigate. 1 4 These are, moreover,
the very same hostile state laws that Friendly saw diversity ju-
risdiction as somehow designed to get around, although Friendly
did not discuss Hamilton's fair administration of justice rationale.
But for Friendly, this was diversity's only purpose. For Hamil-
ton-who believed that diversity jurisdiction addressed a host of
sins, including state court bias against out-of-state litigants and
its risk-it likely was not.
VI. STATE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE LOWER FEDERAL
COURTS
All of Hamilton's arguments regarding judicial independence
discussed thus far relate to the scope of federal judicial power-
power that might have been exercised by a supreme court alone,
mostly on appeal. That Court, unlike the lower federal courts, the
Constitution itself creates.155 But Hamilton also relied on the ju-
dicial dependence of some state courts to support the Constitu-
tion's provision for congressional establishment of lower federal
courts. 156 Opening the discussion in The Federalist No. 81 with a
respectful disclaimer that "the fitness and competency of [state]
courts should be allowed in the utmost latitude," '57 he continued
by explaining the necessity of such a provision.15 His main argu-
ment focused directly on the absence of judicial independence in
154. Prior to the advent of a Due Process Clause applicable to the states, diversity pro-
vided a kind of federal remedy against such class-based discrimination by state political
branches, but only on behalf of out-of-state litigants. See Ann Woolhandler, The Common
Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 86 (1997). For ad-
ditional discussion of diversity as having been designed to avoid certain kinds of state
lawmaking, see Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Le-
gal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79 (1993).
155. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. This is neatly born out by the language of the first judici-
ary statute that purports to create various lower federal courts, but does not purport simi-
larly to create a Supreme Court. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 3-4, 1 Stat. 73, 73-75.
156. Article I gave Congress the power "[tlo constitute Tribunals inferior to the su-
preme Court." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. Article III states that the federal judicial power
"shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish." Id. art. III, § 1.
157. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 11, at 546 (Alexander Hamilton).
158. Id. at 546-47.
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certain of the states.159 Because they "hold[] their offices during
pleasure, or from year to year," Hamilton suggested that those
state judges "will be too little independent to be relied upon for an
inflexible execution of the national laws." °60 He also justified the
grant of power to Congress as a precautionary measure, noting
that "[t]he most discerning cannot foresee how far the prevalency
of a local spirit may be found to disqualify the local tribunals for
the jurisdiction of [the] national causes" associated with Article
III.161 But the concern was not entirely hypothetical or off in the
unforeseeable future. Hamilton stated that even then, "courts
constituted like those of some of the states, would be improper
channels of the judicial authority of the union."62
None of these arguments, however, directly addresses why
lower federal courts, as opposed to the Supreme Court on appeal,
would be needed to handle such concerns. Perhaps Hamilton saw
the possibility of interim mischief arising from state court "execu-
tion of the national laws" pending final review in the Supreme
Court. 16' And perhaps he saw the difficulty of addressing on ap-
pellate review those cases in which a "local spirit" might have
subtly distorted state decisionmaking in Article III cases beyond
repair."' But he did not say so. The closest Hamilton came to an
explanation is a point he made about judicial efficiency: "The
power of constituting inferior courts is evidently calculated to ob-
viate the necessity of having recourse to the supreme court, in
every case of federal cognizance."'65 Absent some provision for
159. See id. Hamilton's first explanation is that a provision empowering Congress to
constitute inferior tribunals might have been necessary even "if it were only to empower
the national legislature to commit to [the state courts] the cognizance of causes arising out
of the national constitution." Id. This might suggest that Hamilton did not think that state
courts could in fact exercise all Article III jurisdiction on their own-outside of the Su-
preme Court's original jurisdiction, perhaps-in contrast to the usual reading of The Fed-
eralist. See also infra note 167.
160. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 11, at 547 (Alexander Hamilton).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. Id. at 546. It might be possible to read this and related language in The Federalist
as arguing for some sort of mandatory vesting of the federal judicial power. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 82, at 556 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("The evident
aim of the plan of the convention is that all the causes of the specified classes, shall for
weighty public reasons receive their original or final determination in the courts of the un-
ion."). But it is also possible that Hamilton was only saying that Article III enables this
possibility, should Congress wish it.
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lower federal courts, the need for appeals to the Supreme Court
would increase, and Hamilton believed that unrestrained appeals
would be a bad thing both for the Court and for litigants.166 But
Hamilton recognized that the need for appeals from state courts
would itself depend on "the grounds of confidence in, or diffidence
of' the state courts, thus indicating that he perceived that the ap-
pellate problem-to which lower federal courts could provide a so-
lution-arose in large measure because that confidence might be
lacking.167
VII. CONCLUSION
Defending the scope of Article III was a delicate task, and the
risk of insult to state courts in any such defense was substantial.
Besides, it appears that many state judiciaries were on a firm
footing and deserving more of imitation than criticism. Too vigor-
ous an attack on the state judiciaries would have been troubling
in a system that appeared to contemplate their substantial in-
volvement in the enforcement of federal law and other judicial
business included within Article III. Too moderate a defense
might have imperiled the Constitution. Moreover, the ultimate
assessment of confidence in the state courts' ability to handle Ar-
ticle III business-whether in the first instance or perhaps all on
their own-would rest largely with Congress.
Hamilton's arguments show a mix of respect for and skepticism
about state courts. 6 Certain of the arguments defending the
scope of judicial power developed in The Federalist did not impli-
166. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 11, at 547 (Alexander Hamilton) ("I should
consider every thing calculated to give in practice, an unrestrained course to appeals as a
source of public and private inconvenience.").
167. Id. There is one other possibility as to why there might have had to be some provi-
sion for lower federal courts. If certain of the jurisdiction in Article III was exclusively fed-
eral by force of the Constitution-for example, those Article III matters over which state
courts lacked pre-existing jurisdiction-state courts would not be able to hear such cases
on their own and for reasons that might have little to do with the dependence of some
state judiciaries on their legislatures. Although most scholars do not believe that such
constitutional exclusivity exists, many Federalists thought that it did, and it is not clear
that Hamilton did not. See Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and
the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 63-73 (1995).
168. See Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review of State-
Court State-Law Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REV. 80, 115-20 (2002) (noting the love/hate
feelings about state courts in The Federalist).
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cate concerns over the structure of the state judiciaries or the
quality of their decisionmaking. But others clearly did, and those
arguments tended to implicate state judicial independence from
the political branches-an argument that Hamilton primarily de-
veloped in connection with the judiciary's role within the federal
government. Moreover, while tenure during good behavior for the
federal judiciary and the removal of the national legislature from
judicial decisionmaking was not a controversial proposition, the
scope of Article III was. And Hamilton used the absence of judi-
cial independence in some of the states to help justify many of the
more contested aspects of Article III jurisdiction. Hamilton tried
to soften the blow of his argument by his repeated suggestion that
there were only a few bad apples in the bunch.'69 But Article III
could not very readily single out the doubtful state judiciaries
from the exemplary ones. Consequently, the Constitution, but
perhaps not Congress,17 ° was obliged to treat all states alike to
remedy the problem of a few.
169. See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 80-82, supra notes 42, 11, 165 (Alexander
Hamilton).
170. Cf. Letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison (Aug. 3, 1789), in 12 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 323 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979) (ex-
pressing Carrington's wish to Representative Madison that Congress might "provide for
separate appointment of inferior Courts in States who may not have good establishments
for themselves").
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